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Abstract
After defining a pure-action profile in a nonatomic aggregative game, where players have specific
continuous pure-action sets and nonsmooth cost functions, as a square-integrable function, we char-
acterize a Wardrop equilibrium (WE) as a solution to an infinite-dimensional generalized variational
inequality. We show the existence of variational WE in monotone nonatomic aggregative games with
coupling constraints. Its uniqueness is proved for strictly or aggregatively strictly monotone cases.
We then show that, for a sequence of finite-player aggregative games with aggregative constraints, if
the players’ pure-action sets converge to those of a strongly (resp. aggregatively strongly) monotone
nonatomic game, and the aggregative constraints in the finite-player games converge to that of the
nonatomic game, then a sequence of variational Nash equilibria in these finite-player games converge
to the variational WE in pure-action profile (resp. aggregate-action profile). Finally, we show how
to construct auxiliary finite-player games for two general classes of nonatomic games.
Keywords. nonatomic aggregative game, coupling aggregative constraints, generalized variational
inequality, monotone game, nonsmooth cost function, variational equilibrium
1 Introduction
This paper studies firstly the existence and uniqueness of variational Wardrop equilibrium in nonatomic
aggregative games with coupling aggregative constraints, where a continuum of players have heterogeneous
compact convex pure-action sets and cost functions. It then examines the convergence of a sequence of
variational Nash equilibrium in auxiliary finite-player games to the variational Wardrop equilibrium.
Background. Aggregative games form a large class of non-cooperative games. In such a game, a player’s
payoff is determined by her own action and the aggregate of all the players’ actions [13]. The setting of
aggregative games is particularly relevant to the study of nonatomic games [45], games with a continuum
of players. There, a player has an interaction with the other players only via an aggregate-level profile
of their actions, for example, the distribution of certain actions, while she has no interest or no way to
know the behavior of any particular player or the identity of the player making a certain choice.
Nonatomic games are readily adapted to many situations in industrial engineering or public sectors
where a huge number of users, such as traffic commuters and electricity consumers, are involved. Those
users have no direct interaction with each other except through the aggregate congestion or consumption
to which they are contributing simultaneously. These situations can often be modeled as a congestion
game, a special class of aggregative games, both in nonatomic version and finite-player version. The latter,
called atomic congestion game, was formally formulated by Rosenthal in 1973 [42], while related research
work in transportation and traffic analysis, mostly in the nonatomic version, appeared much earlier
[9, 51]. The theory of congestion games has also found numerous applications in telecommunications [40],
distributed computing [2], energy management [3], and so on.
The concept of equilibrium in nonatomic games is captured by the so called Wardrop equilibrium
(WE) [51]. A nonatomic player neglects the impact of her deviation on the aggregate profile of the whole
population’s actions, in contrast to a finite player. For the computation of WE, existing results are
limited to particular classes of nonatomic games, such as population games [29, 37, 44], where finite types
of players are considered, each type sharing the same finite number of pure actions and the same payoff
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function. Convergence of some dynamical systems describing the evolution of pure-action distribution in
the population has been established for some particular equilibria in some particular classes such as linear
games [49], potential games [9, 43] and stable games [28, 47]. Algorithms corresponding to discretized
versions of such dynamical systems for the computation of WE have been studied, in particular for
congestion games [20, 52].
Motivation. This paper is mainly motivated by two gaps in the literature on nonatomic games.
Firstly, in engineering applications of nonatomic games such as the management of traffic flow or
energy consumption, individual commuters or consumers often have specific choice sets due to individual
constraints, and specific payoff functions due to personal preferences. Also, unlike for a transportation
user who usually choose a single path, an electricity consumer faces to a resource allocation problem
where she has to divide the consumption of a certain quantity of energy onto different time periods.
Hence, her pure-action set is no longer a finite, discrete set as a commuter but a compact convex set in
RT where T is the total number of time periods. Fewer results exist for the computation of WE for the
case where players have infinitely many different types (i.e. action sets and payoff functions) or where
they have continuous action sets. For example, most of the works in line with Schmeidler [10, 30, 36, 41]
use fixed-point theorems to prove the existence of WE, though in fairly general settings. Besides, most
of the existing work assumes smooth cost functions of players which is somewhat strong.
Secondly, in the above-mentioned applications of aggregative games, coupling constraints, especially
those at aggregative level, commonly exist [23]. Examples are capacity constraints of the network or
power-grid, and ramping constraints on the variation of total energy consumption between time periods.
In this regard, there are even fewer studies in game-theoretical modeling of nonatomic game. However, the
presence of coupling constraints adds non trivial difficulties in the analysis of WE and their computation.
Indeed, an appropriate definition of equilibrium is already not obvious. An analog to the so-called
generalized Nash equilibrium [25] for finite-player games does not exist for nonatomic games because a
nonatomic player’s behavior has no impact on the aggregative profile. Moreover, dynamical systems and
algorithms used to compute Wardrop equilibria in population games cannot be straightforwardly extended
to this case. Indeed, in these dynamics and algorithms, players adapt their strategies unilaterally in their
respective strategy spaces, which can well lead to a new strategy profile violating the coupling constraint.
In view of these two gaps, the main objective of this paper is to provide a model of nonatomic
aggregative games with infinitely many player-specific, compact convex pure-action sets and infinitely
many player-specific nonsmooth payoff functions, then introduce a general form of coupling aggregative
constraints into these games, choose an appropriate equilibrium notion, study their properties such as
existence and uniqueness and, finally, their computation.
Main results. After defining a pure-action profile in a nonatomic aggregative game where players have
specific compact convex pure-action sets lying in RT , and specific cost functions, convex in their own
action variable but nonsmooth, Theorem 3.1 characterizes a Wardrop equilibrium (WE) as a solution to
an infinite-dimensional generalized variational inequality (IDGVI).
Theorem 3.3 proves the existence of WE and variational Wardrop equilibrium (VWE), equilibrium no-
tion in the presence of coupling constraints defined by a similar IDGVI, in monotone nonatomic games by
showing the existence of solutions to the characteristic IDGVI. Then, Theorem 3.4 shows the uniqueness
of WE and VWE in case of strictly monotone or aggregatively strictly monotone games. The definition of
monotone games is an extension of the stable games [28], also called dissipative games [48], in population
games with a finite types of nonatomic players to the case with infinitely many types.
Theorem 4.1 is the main result of this paper. It shows that, for a sequence of finite-player aggregative
games, if the players’ pure-action sets converge to those of a strongly monotone (resp. aggregatively
strongly monotone) nonatomic aggregative game, and if the aggregative constraints in these finite-player
games converge to the aggregative constraint in the nonatomic game, then a sequence of so-called vari-
ational Nash equilibria (VNE) in these finite-player games converge, in pure-action profile (resp. in
aggregate-action profile), to the VWE. We provide an upper bound on the distance between the VNE
and VWE, specified as a function of the parameters of the finite-player and nonatomic games.
This result allows the construction of an auxiliary sequence of finite-player games with finite-dimensional
VNE so as to approximate the infinite-dimensional VWE in the special class of strongly or aggregatively
strongly monotone nonatomic aggregative games, with or without aggregative constraints. Since there
are much more results [17] on the resolution of finite-dimensional variational inequalities characterizing
VNE, we can therefore obtain an approximation of the VWE with arbitrary precision.
Finally, we show how to construct an AAS for two general classes of nonatomic games.
Related work. Extensive research has been conducted on Wardrop equilibria in nonatomic congestion
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games via their formulation with variational inequalities [34], while the similar characterization of Nash
equilibria in atomic splittable games, where players have continuous action sets in contrast to unsplittable
games where players have finite action sets, has been less studied [27, 40]. In addition to their existence and
uniqueness, the computational and dynamical aspects of equilibria as solutions to variational inequalities
have also been studied [11, 46, 52, 54]. However, in most cases, the variational inequalities involved
have finite dimensions, as opposed to the case of Wardrop equilibrium in this paper. Marcotte and
Zhu [35] consider nonatomic players with continuous types (leading to a characterization of the Wardrop
equilibrium as an infinite-dimensional variational inequality) and studied the equilibrium in an aggregative
game with nonatomic players differentiated through a linear parameter in their cost function.
Some results have already been given to quantify the relationship between Nash and Wardrop equilib-
ria. Haurie and Marcotte [27] show that in a sequence of atomic splittable games where atomic splittable
players are replaced by smaller and smaller equal-size players with constant total weight, Nash equilibria
converge to the Wardrop equilibrium of a nonatomic game. Their proof is based on the convergence of
variational inequalities corresponding to the sequence of Nash equilibria, a technique similar to the one
used in this paper. Wan [50] generalizes this result to composite games where nonatomic players and
atomic splittable players coexist, by allowing the atomic players to replace themselves by players with
heterogeneous sizes.
Gentile et al. [21] consider a specific class of finite-player aggregative games with linear coupling
constraints. They use the variational inequality formulations for the unique generalized Nash equilibrium
and the unique generalized Wardrop-type equilibrium (which consists in letting each finite player act as
if she was nonatomic) of the same finite-player game to show that, when the number of players grows, the
former can be approximated by the latter. There are several differences between our model and theirs.
Firstly, we consider nonatomic games with players of infinitely-many different types instead of finite-
player games only. Secondly, we consider variational Nash and Wardrop equilibria instead of generalized
equilibria (which does not exist in nonatomic games). In contrast to generalized equilibria, a variational
equilibrium is not characterized by a best reply condition for each of the finite or nonatomic players,
which makes the study of its properties much more difficult, as shown in Section 4. Thirdly, we allow for
nonsmooth cost functions and general form of coupling constraints while they consider differentiable cost
functions and linear coupling constraints.
Milchtaich [38] studies finite and nonatomic crowding games (similar to aggregative games), where
players have finitely many pure actions, and shows that, if each player in an n-person game is replaced by
m identical replicas with constant total weight, pure Nash equilibria generically converge to the unique
equilibrium of the limit nonatomic game as m goes to infinity. His proof is not based on a variational
inequality formulation.
Structure. The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the definition of finite-
player aggregative games with and without aggregative constraints, the notion of equilibrium in these
cases and their properties. Section 3 is dedicated to nonatomic aggregative games with and without
aggregative constraints. After defining Wardrop equilibrium and variational Wardrop equilibrium, we
concentrate on the special class of monotone games and show the existence and uniqueness of equilibria
there via generalized infinite dimensional variational inequalities. In Section 4, we give the definition
of an approximating sequence of finite-player games for a nonatomic aggregative game with or without
coupling constraints, and present the main theorem of the paper on the convergence of the sequence
of (variational) Nash equilibria of the approximating finite-player games to the (variational) Wardrop
equilibrium of the nonatomic game. The construction of such a sequence of approximating finite-player
games is shown for two important classes of nonatomic games.
Notations. Vectors are denoted by a bold font (e.g. x) as opposed to scalars (e.g. x).
The transpose of vector x is denoted by xτ .
The closed unit ball in a metric space, centered at x and of radius η, is denoted by Nη(x).
For a nonempty convex set C in a Hilbert space H (over R),
• TC(x) = {y ∈ H : y = 0 or ∃(xk)k in C s.t. xk 6≡ x,xk → x, xk−x‖xk−x‖ →
y
‖y‖} is the tangent cone
of C at x ∈ C;
• spanC = {∑ki=1 αixi : k ∈ N, αi ∈ R,xi ∈ C} is the linear span of C;
• affC = {∑ki=1 αixi : k ∈ N, αi ∈ R,∑i αi = 1,xi ∈ C} is the affine hull of C;
• riC = {x ∈ C : ∃η > 0 s.t. Nη(x) ∩ affC ⊂ C} is the relative interior of C;
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• rbdC is the relative boundary of C in H, i.e. the boundary of C in spanC.
The inner product of two points x and y in any Euclidean space RT is denoted by 〈x,y〉 = ∑Ti=1 xiyi.
The l2-norm of x is denoted by ‖x‖ , 〈x,x〉1/2.
We denote by L2([0, 1],RT ) the Hilbert space of measurable functions from [0, 1] (equipped with the
Lebesgue measure µ) to RT that are square integrable with respect to the Lebesgue measure . The inner
product of two vector functions F and G is denoted by 〈F,G〉2 =
∫ 1
0 〈F (θ), G(θ)〉dθ. The Hilbert space
L2([0, 1],RT ) is endowed with L2-norm: ‖F‖2 = 〈F, F 〉1/22 .
The distance between a point x and a set A is denoted by dm(x, A) , infy∈A ‖x− y‖m, where m is
omitted or is equal to 2, depending on whether we consider an Euclidean space or L2([0, 1],RT ).
Similarly, the Hausdorff distance between two sets A and B is denoted by dH,m(A,B), which is defined
as max{supx∈A dm(x, B), supy∈B dm(y, B)}. Later, we will define new metrics indexed by ν in Euclidean
spaces. The point-set distances and Hausdorff distances are defined similarly and denoted with index ν.
The subdifferential, i.e. set of subgradients of a convex function f at x ∈ RT in its domain C, which
is a convex set in RT , is denoted by ∂f(x). Recall that if vector g ∈ RT is a subgradient of f at x, then
for all z ∈ C, f(z) ≥ f(x) + 〈g, z − x〉.
For a function (x,X) 7→ f(x,X) of two explicit variables, convex in x, we denote by ∂1f(x,X) the
(nonempty) subdifferential of function f(·,X) for any fixed X.
2 Finite-player aggregative games
This section recalls the definition of finite-player aggregative games with and without coupling aggregative
constraints, and some notions of equilibrium in these games as well as their characterization by generalized
variational inequalities.
Definition 2.1 (Finite-player aggregative game). A finite-player aggregative game is a non-cooperative
game specified by:
(i) a finite set of players I = {1, . . . , I},
(ii) a set of feasible pure actions Xi ⊂ RT for each player i, where T ∈ N∗ a constant, with a typical pure
action xi = (xi,t)Tt=1 ∈ Xi,
(iii) a cost function Xi×RT → R : fi(xi,
∑
j∈I xj) for each player i, so that a player’s cost is determined
by her own action and the aggregate action profile.
Denote X˜ , X1 × · · · × XI . The pure-action profile of the players x , (xi)i∈I induces an aggregate-
action profile load attributed to arc t ∈ T , which is denoted by X = (Xt)Tt=1 where Xt =
∑
i∈I xi,t.
Denote the set of feasible aggregate-action profiles by X , {X ∈ RT : ∃x ∈ X˜ s.t. ∑i∈I xi = X}.
Denote the game by G = (I, X˜ , (fi)i∈I).
The following assumptions and notations are adopted in this paper.
Assumption 1 (Convex costs). For each i ∈ I, the function fˆi(xi,X−i) , fi(xi,X), where X−i =∑
j∈I,j 6=i xj, is continuous in xi and in X−i, and is convex in xi for all x−i = (xj)j∈I,j 6=i ∈
∏
j∈I,j 6=i Xj.
Assumption 2 (Convex and compact strategy sets). For each i ∈ I, the set Xi is a nonempty, convex
and compact subset of RT .
Recall the definition of Nash Equilibrium in finite-player non-cooperative games.
Definition 2.2 (Nash Equilibrium (NE) [39] ). A (pure) Nash equilibrium of G is a profile of pure actions
xˆ ∈ X˜ such that fˆi(xˆi,X−i) ≤ fˆi(xi,X−i) for all xi ∈ Xi and all i ∈ I.
Define a correspondence H : X˜ ⇒ RIT by
∀x ∈ X˜ , H(x) , {(gi)i∈I ∈ RIT : gi ∈ ∂1fˆi(xi,X−i), ∀i ∈ I} =
∏
i∈I
∂1fˆi(xi,X−i) .
Since the cost functions are convex in players’ own strategies, NE can be characterized as solutions to
generalized variational inequalities (GVI) [19].
Proposition 2.1 (GVI formulation of NE). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, xˆ ∈ X˜ is an NE of G if and
only if either of the following two equivalent conditions holds:
∀i ∈ I,∃gi ∈ ∂1fˆi(xˆi, Xˆ−i) s.t.
〈
gi,xi − xˆi
〉 ≥ 0, ∀xi ∈ Xi, (1a)
∃g ∈ H(xˆ) s.t. 〈g,x− xˆ〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X˜ . (1b)
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Proof. Eq. (1a) is a necessary and sufficient condition for xˆi to minimize the convex function fˆi(., Xˆ−i)
on Xi ([8, Proposition 27.8]). The equivalence between (1a) and (1b) is obvious.
Remark 2.1 (Generalized VI and Generalized NE are different things). The variational inequalities
(VI) are of generalized type here because the subdifferentials of cost functions are not necessarily singled
valued. In the case that cost functions are differentiable with respect to the players’ own actions, the
GVI are reduced to a VI. Do not confuse with generalized NE in generalized games (cf. Definition 2.3 )
which are characterized by (generalized-)quasi-VI.
The existence of an NE is obtained by a classical result in game theory for finite-player continuous
game, since the players have convex continuous cost functions and convex compact pure-action sets. No
differentiability condition is needed.
Proposition 2.2 (Existence of NE, [15, 18, 22]). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, G admits an NE.
Remark 2.2 (NE is a unilateral level stability condition). The NE condition ensures stability not
only in terms of a single player’s behavior but also in terms of their collective welfare. Indeed, on the
one hand, condition (1a) is equivalent to 〈gi,yi〉 ≥ 0 for all yi ∈ TXi(xˆi) for each i, i.e. a unilater-
ally feasible deviation of player i increases her cost; on the other hand, condition (1b) is equivalent to
〈g,y〉 ≥ 0 for all y ∈ TX˜ (xˆ), i.e. a collectively feasible deviation of all the players increases their total
costs. The two conditions are equivalent because the players have independent pure-action spaces so
that TX˜ (xˆ) =
∏
i∈I TXi(xˆi), i.e. any collectively feasible deviation can be decomposed into unilaterally
feasible deviations. This remark is important because it is no longer the case when one introduces a
coupling constraint in the game.
The coupling aggregative constraint considered in this paper is of the following general form: There
is a nonempty, convex and compact subset A of RT , whose intersection with X is not empty, such that
the aggregate-action profile X ∈ A. An example is A = {X ∈ RT+ : M t ≤ Xt ≤ M t,∀t ∈ T ; at ≤
Xt+1 −Xt ≤ bt,∀t ∈ T \ {T}}.
Definition 2.3 (Finite-player aggregative game with aggregative constraints). Its only difference from the
game defined in Definition 2.1 is that, for each player i ∈ I, given the profile of pure actions of the others
players y−i ∈
∏
j∈I\{i} Xj , her feasible pure-action set becomes Xi(y−i) , {xi ∈ Xi : (xi,y−i) ∈ X˜ (A)},
where X˜ (A) is a subset of X˜ defined by
X˜ (A) =
{
x ∈ X˜ : X = ∑i∈I xi ∈ A} .
This game is denoted by G(A) = (I, X˜ , A, (fi)i∈I) or simply G(A).
Finite-player non-cooperative games with coupling constraints are called generalized Nash games [25].
The extension from games to generalized games is not trivial. In the case with no coupling constraint,
the pure-action spaces of the players are independent so that any collectively feasible deviation can be
decomposed into unilaterally feasible deviation. This property does not always hold with a coupling
constraint. To see this, we recall the following notion of generalized equilibrium in generalized games.
Definition 2.4 (Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE), [25]). A profile of pure actions xˆ ∈ X is a
generalized Nash equilibrium of G(A) if
xˆi ∈ Xi(xˆ−i) and fˆi(xˆi, Xˆ−i) ≤ fˆi(xi, Xˆ−i), ∀xi ∈ Xi(xˆ−i), ∀i ∈ I .
Its characterization by generalized quasi-variational inequalities (GQVI) [12] can be proved as for
Proposition 2.1 .
Proposition 2.3 (GQVI formulation of GNE). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, xˆ ∈ X˜ is a GNE of G(A)
if and only if one of the following two equivalent conditions holds:
∀i ∈ I : xˆi ∈ X˜ (xˆ−i) and ∃gi ∈ ∂1fˆi(xˆi, Xˆ−i) s.t.
〈
gi,xi − xˆi
〉 ≥ 0, ∀xi ∈ Xi(xˆ−i) (2a)
xˆ ∈ X˜ (xˆ) ,
∏
i∈I
Xi(x−i) and ∃g ∈ H(xˆ) s.t.
〈
g,x− xˆ〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X˜ (xˆ) . (2b)
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Remark 2.3 (Problematics of GNE). The notion of GNE can be problematic. Given a pure-action
profile x ∈ X˜ (A), firstly simultaneous unilateral deviations can lead to a new profile out of X˜ (A).
Secondly, if X˜ (x) ∩ X˜ (A) is a proper set of X˜ (A), profiles in X˜ (A) \ X˜ (x) are not feasible. Indeed, the
unilateral stability condition (2a) is equivalent to collective stability only among those collective deviations
composed by unilaterally feasible deviations, i.e. condition (2b), because TX (xˆ)(xˆ) =
∏
i∈I TX˜i(xˆ−i)(xˆi).
Collective deviations towards X˜ (A)\X˜ (x) are not composed by unilaterally feasible deviations while they
may effectively decrease the total cost or even each player’s cost (cf. [25] for an example). A GNE can
thus lose its stability when such collective deviations are allowed. To answer to this issue, we consider
the stronger notion of equilibrium defined below:
Definition 2.5 (Variational Nash Equilibrium (VNE), [25]). A solution to the following GVI problem:
Find xˆ ∈ X˜ (A) s.t. ∃g ∈ H(xˆ) s.t. 〈g,x− xˆ〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X˜ (A). (3)
is called a variational Nash equilibrium of G(A). In particular, if X ⊂ A, a VNE is a NE.
A pure-action profile xˆ ∈ X˜ (A) is a VNE if and only if a collective deviation to any profile in X˜ (A) is
not collectively beneficial. Indeed, VNE is also unilaterally stable, because it is a GNE [25, Theorem 3].
Proposition 2.4 ([25]). In G(A), under Assumption 2, any VNE is a GNE.
Remark 2.4 (VNE refines GNE). VNE can be seen as a refinement of GNE [31]. With a small pertur-
bation of A, a GNE which is not a VNE can no longer be an equilibrium. Harker [25] gives an example
of a GNE which is not a VNE.
Hence, VNE is adopted in this paper as the equilibrium notion in the presence of aggregative con-
straints. Moreover, in Section 3.3 it is argued that the notion of generalized equilibrium cannot even be
established in nonatomic games.
Proposition 2.5 (Existence of VNE). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, G(A) admits a VNE.
Proof. From the convexity of each fˆi, we deduce that H is a nonempty, convex, compact valued, upper
hemicontinuous correspondence. Then [12, Corollary 3.1] shows that the GVI problem (3) admits a
solution on the finite dimensional convex compact X˜ (A). (In the case that the fˆi is partially differentiable
with respect to xi, then the GVI is reduced to a VI, and Lemma 3.1 in [26] suffices to show the existence
of a solution.)
3 A Continuum of Players: Nonatomic Framework
3.1 Nonatomic aggregative games
In nonatomic aggregative games considered here, players have compact pure-action sets, and heteroge-
neous pure-action sets as well as heterogeneous cost function. This model is in line with the Schmeidler’s
seminal paper [45], but in contrast to most of the population games studied in game theory [29, 44] where
nonatomic players are grouped into several populations, with players in the same population have the
same finite pure-action set and the same cost function.
Definition 3.1 (Nonatomic aggregative game). A nonatomic aggregative game G is defined by:
(i) a continuum of players represented by points on the real interval Θ = [0, 1] endowed with Lebesgue
measure,
(ii) a set of feasible pure actions Xθ ⊂ RT for each player θ ∈ Θ, with T ∈ N∗ a constant, and
(iii) a cost function Xθ ×RT → R : fθ(xθ,X) for each player θ, where X = (Xt)Tt=1 and Xt ,
∫ 1
0 xθ,t dθ
denotes the aggregate-action profile.
The set of feasible pure-action profiles is defined by:
X˜ , {x ∈ L2([0, 1],RT ) : ∀ a.e. θ ∈ Θ,xθ ∈ Xθ} .
Denote the game by G = (Θ, X˜ , (fθ)θ∈Θ).
Remark 3.1. The definition of a nonatomic game asks the pure-action profile x to be a measurable and
integrable function on Θ instead of simply being a collection of xθ ∈ Xθ for θ ∈ Θ. In other words, a
coupling constraint is inherent in the definition of nonatomic games and the notion of WE. This is in
contrast to finite-player games.
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The set of feasible aggregate actions is X , {X ∈ RT : ∃x ∈ X˜ s.t. ∫ 10 xθ dθ = X}.
Further assumptions are necessary for X˜ to be nonempty and for the existence of equilibria to be
discussed later.
Assumption 3 (Nonatomic pure-action sets). The correspondence X : Θ⇒ RT , θ 7→ Xθ has nonempty,
convex, compact values and measurable graph GrX = {(θ,xθ) ∈ RT+1 : θ ∈ Θ,xθ ∈ Xθ}, i.e. GrX is a
Borel subset of RT+1. Moreover, for all θ ∈ Θ, Xθ ⊂ NM (0), with M > 0 a constant.
Under Assumption 3, a sufficient condition for x to be in L2([0, 1],RT ) is that x is measurable.
Notations. Denote M = [0,M + 1]T .
Assumption 4 (Nonatomic convex cost functions). For all θ, fθ is defined on (M′)2, where M′ is a
neighborhood of M, and is bounded on M2, and for each aggregate profile Y ∈M,
(i) function GrX → RT : (θ,xθ) 7→ fθ(xθ,Y ) is measurable.
(ii) for each θ ∈ Θ, function xθ 7→ fθ(xθ,Y ) is continuous and convex on M′;
(iii) There is Bf > 0 such that ‖g‖ ≤ Bf for all subgradients g ∈ ∂1fθ(xθ,Y ) for each xθ ∈ M, each
Y ∈M, and each θ ∈ Θ.
Remark 3.2. Assumption 4.(iii) implies that fθ(·, ·)’s are Lipschitz in the first variable with a uniform
Lipschitz constant Bf on M2 for all θ. Besides, if fθ(·,y) is differentiable on M, then ∂1fθ(xθ,Y )
contains one element ∇1fθ(xθ,Y ), the gradient of fθ(·,Y ) at xθ.
Wardrop equilibrium extends the notion of Nash equilibrium in the framework of nonatomic games,
where a single player of measure zero has a negligible impact on the others.
Definition 3.2 (Wardrop Equilibrium (WE), [51]). A pure-action profile x∗ ∈ X˜ is a Wardrop equilibrium
of nonatomic game G if
fθ(x∗θ,X∗) ≤ fθ(xθ,X∗), ∀xθ ∈ Xθ, ∀ a.e. θ ∈ Θ .
Before characterizing WE by infinite-dimensional GVI, let us introduce some notions and a technical
assumption ensuring that the infinite-dimensional GVI is well-defined.
First, define a correspondence H : L2([0, 1],M)⇒ L2([0, 1],RT ) as follows:
H(x) , {g = (gθ)θ∈Θ ∈ L2([0, 1],RT ) : gθ ∈ ∂1fθ(xθ,
∫
x),∀ a.e. θ ∈ Θ}, ∀x ∈ L2([0, 1],M). (4)
In other words, H(x) is the collection of measurable (and integrable because of Assumption 4.(iii))
selections of a subgradient for each xθ.
Next, define a best-reply correspondence Br from the set of aggregate-action profiles X to the set of
pure-action profiles X˜ :
Br(Y ) , {x ∈ X˜ : xθ ∈ arg minXθ fθ(·,Y ),∀θ ∈ Θ}, ∀Y ∈ X .
Finally, fix Y ∈ X and x ∈ Br(Y ), define a correspondence D(x,Y ) from Θ to RT as follows:
D(x,Y )(θ) , {gθ ∈ ∂1fθ(xθ,Y ) : 〈gθ,yθ − xθ〉 ≥ 0,∀yθ ∈ Xθ}, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (5)
Clearly, this is a nonempty and closed-valued correspondence.
Assumption 5. For all Y ∈ X and all x ∈ Br(Y ), D(x,Y ) is a measurable correspondence.
Theorem 3.1 (GVI formulation of WE). Under Assumptions 3 to 5, x∗ ∈ X˜ is a WE of nonatomic
game G if and only if either of the following two equivalent conditions is true:
∀ a.e. θ ∈ Θ, ∃gθ ∈ ∂1fθ(x∗θ,X∗) s.t 〈gθ,xθ − x∗θ〉 ≥ 0, ∀xθ ∈ Xθ , (6a)
∃g ∈ H(x∗) s.t
∫
Θ
〈gθ,xθ − x∗θ〉dθ ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X˜ . (6b)
We need the following lemma for the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 3.1.
(1) For all x ∈ L2([0, 1],M), H(x) is nonempty.
(2) For all Y ∈ X , Br(Y ) is nonempty.
(3) Under Assumption 5, for all Y ∈ X and all x ∈ Br(Y ), there exists a measurable mapping θ 7→ gθ
such that gθ ∈ D(x,Y )(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ.
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Proof. (1) For each θ, the subdifferential ∂1fθ(xθ,
∫
x) is nonempty and compact valued, so that a
measurable selection exists according to the compact-valued selection theorem [6].
(2) Fix Y ∈ X . A consequence of Assumption 4.(i-ii) is that the function Θ ×M → R : (θ,z) 7→
fθ(z,Y ) is a Carathe´odory function, that is, (i) f·(z,Y ) is measurable on Θ for each z ∈ M, and (ii)
fθ(·,Y ) is continuous on M for each θ ∈ Θ. Thus, according to the measurable maximum theorem
[1, Thm. 18.19] applied to f·(·,Y ), there exists a selection xθ ∈ arg minXθ fθ(·,Y ) such that x is a
measurable function on Θ.
(3) Because of Assumption 5, one can apply the compact-valued selection theorem [6].
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Given X∗, (6a) is a necessary and sufficient condition for x∗θ to minimize the
convex function fθ(.,X∗) on Xθ. Condition (6a) implies condition (6b) because of Assumption 5.
For the converse, suppose that x∗ ∈ X˜ satisfies condition (6b) but not (6a). Then there must be a
subset Θ′ of Θ with strictly positive measure such that for each θ ∈ Θ′, x∗θ /∈ Yθ , arg minXθ fθ(·,X∗).
In particular, for any yθ ∈ Yθ, 〈gθ, yθ−x∗θ〉 < fθ(yθ,X∗)−fθ(x∗θ,X∗) < 0. By the same argument as in
the proof of Lemma 3.1, one can select a yθ ∈ arg minXθ fθ(·,X∗) for θ ∈ Θ′ such that Θ′ → RT : θ 7→ yθ
is measurable. By defining yθ = x∗θ for θ /∈ Θ′, one has Θ → RT : θ 7→ yθ is measurable and hence
belongs to X˜ . However, ∫Θ〈gθ,yθ − x∗θ〉dθ = ∫Θ′〈gθ,yθ − x∗θ〉dθ < 0, contradicting (6b).
Remark 3.3. Condition (6a) is equivalent to 〈gθ(x∗θ,X∗),yθ〉 ≥ 0 for all yθ ∈ TXθ (x∗θ) for each θ. The
interpretation is the same as for atomic players at NE: no unilateral deviation is profitable. However,
since each nonatomic player has measure zero, when considering a deviation in the profile of pure actions,
one must let players in a set of strictly positive measure deviate: (6b) means that the collective deviation
of players of any set of strictly positive measure increases their cost. Note that the GVI problem (6b)
has infinite dimensions.
The existence of WE is obtained by an equilibrium existence theorem for nonatomic games.
Theorem 3.2 (Existence of a WE, [41]). Under Assumptions 3 and 4.(1), if for all θ and all Y ∈ M,
fθ(·,Y ) is continuous on M, then the nonatomic aggregative game G admits a WE.
Proof. The conditions required in Remark 8 in Rath’s 1992 paper [41] on the existence of WE in aggregate
games are satisfied.
Remark 3.4. No convexity of fθ(·,Y )’s are needed.
3.2 Monotone nonatomic aggregative games
For the uniqueness of WE and the existence of equilibrium notion to be introduced in the next subsection
for the case with coupling constraints, let us introduce the following notions of monotone nonatomic
games.
Definition 3.3. The nonatomic aggregative game G is monotone if∫
Θ
〈gθ − hθ,xθ − yθ〉dθ ≥ 0, ∀x,y ∈ L2([0, 1],M) and g ∈ H(x),h ∈ H(y). (7)
It is strictly monotone if the equality in (7) holds if and only if x = y almost everywhere.
It is aggregatively strictly monotone if the equality in (7) holds if and only if
∫
x =
∫
y.
It is strongly monotone with modulus α if∫
Θ
〈gθ − hθ,xθ − yθ〉dθ ≥ α‖x− y‖22, ∀x,y ∈ L2([0, 1],M) and g ∈ H(x),h ∈ H(y). (8)
It is aggregatively strongly monotone with modulus β if∫
Θ
〈gθ − hθ,xθ − yθ〉dθ ≥ β‖
∫
x− ∫ y‖2, ∀x,y ∈ L2([0, 1],M) and g ∈ H(x),h ∈ H(y). (9)
Remark 3.5. Eq. (7) means nothing else but H is a monotone correspondence on L2([0, 1],M) (cf. [8,
Definition 20.1] for the definition of monotone correspondence in Hilbert spaces).
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Remark 3.6. A recent paper of Hadikhanloo [24] generalizes the notion of stable games in population
games [28] to monotone games in anonymous games, an extension of population games with players
having heterogeneous compact pure-action sets but the same payoff function. He defines the notion of
monotonicity directly on the distribution of pure-actions among the players instead of pure-action profile
as we do. The two approaches are compatible.
Examples of aggregative games are given by cost functions of the form:
fθ(xθ,X) = 〈xθ, c(X)〉 − uθ(xθ) . (10)
Here c(X) specifies the per-unit cost (or negative of per-unit utility) of each of the T “public products”,
which is a function of the aggregative contribution X to each of the “public products”. Player θ’s cost
(resp. negative of utility) associated to these products is scaled by her own contribution xθ. The function
uθ(xθ) measures the private utility of player θ (resp. negative of private cost) for the contribution xθ.
For instance, in a public goods game, −ct(Xt) is the common per-unit payoff for using public good t,
determined by the total contribution Xt, while −uθ(xθ) is player θ’s private cost of supplying xθ to the
public goods; in a Cournot competition, −ct(Xt) is the common market price for product t, determined
by its total supply Xt, while −uθ(xθ) is player θ’s private cost of producing xθ,t unit of product t for
each product t; in a congestion game, ct(Xt) is the common per-unit cost for using arc t in a network,
determined by the aggregate load Xt on arc t, while uθ(xθ) is player θ’s private utility of her routing or
energy consuming choice xθ.
Proposition 3.1. Under Assumptions 3 to 5, in a nonatomic aggregative game G with cost functions of
form (10), assume that c is monotone on M and, for each θ, uθ is a concave function on M. Then:
(1) G is a monotone game.
(2) If uθ is strictly concave on M for all θ ∈ Θ, then G is a strictly monotone game.
(3) If c is strictly monotone on M, then G is an aggregatively strictly monotone game.
(4) If uθ is strongly concave on M with modulus αθ for each θ ∈ Θ and infθ∈Θ αθ = α > 0, then G is a
strongly monotone game with modulus α.
(5) If c is strongly monotone on M with β, then G is an aggregatively strongly monotone game with
modulus β.
Proof. (1) Let x,y ∈ X˜ and X = ∫ x, Y = ∫ y. For each θ, ∂1fθ(xθ,Y ) = {c(Y )+g : g ∈ ∂(−uθ)(xθ)}.
Then, given x,y ∈ X˜ , with gθ ∈ ∂(−uθ)(xθ) and hθ ∈ ∂(−uθ)(yθ) for each θ, one has 〈gθ(xθ) −
hθ(yθ),xθ − yθ〉 ≥ 0 because uθ is concave so that ∂(−uθ) is a monotone correspondence on Xθ.
Then
∫ 1
0 〈(c(X) + gθ(xθ)) − (c(Y ) − hθ(yθ)),xθ − yθ〉dθ = 〈c(X) − c(Y ),X − Y 〉 +
∫ 1
0 〈gθ(xθ) −
hθ(yθ),xθ − yθ〉dθ ≥ 0 because c is monotone. Hence G is a monotone game.
The proof for (2)-(5) is omitted.
In particular, if c(X) = (ct(Xt))t∈T , then c is monotone if ct’s are all non-decreasing, and c is strongly
monotone if ct’s are all strictly increasing.
3.3 Nonatomic aggregative games with aggregate constraints
Let us consider the aggregative constraint in nonatomic aggregative game G: X ∈ A, where A is a convex
compact subset of RT such that A ∩ X 6= ∅. Let X˜ (A) be a subset of X˜ defined by X˜ (A) , {x ∈ X˜ :
X =
∫
x ∈ A}. Denote the nonatomic game with aggregative constraint G(A).
In contrast to games with finitely many players, a generalized equilibrium in the style of Definition 2.4
is not well-defined in a nonatomic game. Indeed, since the impact of a nonatomic player’s choice on the
aggregative profile is negligible, the feasible pure-action set of a nonatomic player θ facing the choices
of the others x−θ in a game with coupling constraint is not a well-established notion: either
∫
x−θ ∈ A
then Xθ = X , or
∫
x−θ /∈ A then Xθ = ∅. Departing from a pure-action profile in X˜ (A), simultaneous
unilateral deviations by the players can lead to any profile in X˜ . If only profiles in X (A) are allowed to be
attained, then one lands on a notion similar to VNE. Indeed, the most natural notion of equilibrium with
the presence of aggregative constraint is the notion of variational Wardrop equilibrium, where feasible
deviations are defined on a collective basis.
Definition 3.4 (Variational Wardrop Equilibrium (VWE)). A solution to the following infinite dimen-
sional GVI problem:
Find x∗ ∈ X˜ (A) and g ∈ H(x∗) s.t.
∫
Θ
〈gθ,xθ − x∗θ〉dθ ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X˜ (A), (11)
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is called a variational Wardrop equilibrium of G(A), where the correspondence H is as defined by Eq. (4).
Remark 3.7 (Justification for VWE). From a game theoretical point of view, the notion of VWE can
be problematic as well. Each nonatomic player can deviate unilaterally without having any impact on
the aggregate profile. The unilateral stability as for NE and VNE (cf. Remarks 2.2 and 2.4) is lost.
However, our main theorem, Theorem 4.1, shows that VWE can be seen as the limit of a sequence of
VNE which are unilaterally stable. Finally, in the literation of congestion games, the equilibrium notion
characterized by VI of form (11) but in finite dimension and with smooth cost functions has long been
studied. For example, see [14, 32, 33, 53] and references therein.
The following facts are needed for later use. Under Assumption 3:
• X˜ is a nonempty, convex, closed and bounded subset of L2([0, 1],RT );
• X˜ (A) is a nonempty, convex and closed subset of X˜ ;
• X and A ∩ X are nonempty, convex and compact subsets of RT .
We omit the proof and only point out that X˜ and X are nonempty because of Assumption 3 and the
measurable selection theorem of Aumann [5], while aggregate-action set X is compact by [4, Theorem 4].
Theorem 3.3 shows the existence of VWE via the VI approach. Compared with Theorem 3.2, much
stronger conditions are required on cost functions.
Assumption 6 (Continuity of cost function in aggregate action). For each θ ∈ Θ and xθ ∈M, fθ(xθ, ·)
is continuous on M.
Theorem 3.3 (Existence of VWE). Under Assumptions 3, 4 and 6, if nonatomic game with coupling
constraint G(A) is monotone on X˜ (A), then a VWE exists.
Proof. Let us apply [16, Corollary 2.1] to show that Eq. (11) has a solution. This theorem states that
if X˜ (A) is bounded, closed and convex in L2([0, 1],RT ), and if H : L2([0, 1],M) ⇒ L2([0, 1],RT ) is a
monotone correspondence which is upper hemicontinuous from the line segments in X˜ (A) to the weak*
topology of L2([0, 1],RT ), then (11) admits a solution. We only need to show the upper hemicontinuity
property. First notice that H(·) has closed values. Take x and y in X˜ (A), consider sequence (x(k))k with
x(k) = x+ 1k (y−x), and sequence (g(k))k such that g(k) ∈ H(x(k)) and g(k)
∗
⇀ g with g ∈ L2([0, 1],RT ).
Let us show that g ∈ H(x).
Denote X =
∫
x and X(k) =
∫
x(k). Then X(k) converges to X in l2-norm.
By definition of H, for each z ∈ M, for each θ, fθ(zθ,X(k)θ ) ≥ fθ(x(k)θ ,X(k)) + 〈g(k)θ , zθ − x(k)θ 〉.
Since fθ is continuous in both variables, fθ(zθ,X(k)) → fθ(zθ,X) and fθ(x(k)θ ,X(k)) → fθ(xθ,X).
Besides, 〈g(k)θ , zθ − x(k)θ 〉 = 〈g(k)θ , zθ − xθ〉 + 〈g(k)θ ,xθ − x(k)θ 〉, and 〈g(k)θ , zθ − xθ〉 → 〈gθ, zθ − xθ〉
because g ∗⇀ g, while 〈g(k)θ ,xθ − x(k)θ 〉 → 0 because g(k)θ ’s are uniformly bounded by Bf . Therefore,
fθ(zθ,X) ≥ fθ(x(k)θ ,X)+ 〈gθ, zθ−xθ〉 so that gθ ∈ ∂1fθ(xθ,X). Since the limit of measurable functions
is measurable, g is measurable. Hence g ∈ H(x), which concludes the proof.
Theorem 3.4 (Uniqueness of VWE). Under Assumptions 3 and 4:
(1) if G(A) is strictly monotone on X˜ (A), then it has at most one VWE;
(2) if G(A) is aggregatively strictly monotone on X˜ (A), then all VWE of G(A) have the same aggregative
profile;
(3) if G (without aggregative constraint) is only aggregatively strictly monotone but, for each θ ∈ Θ and
all Y ∈M, fθ(x,Y ) is strictly convex in x, then there is at most one WE.
Proof. Suppose that x,y ∈ X˜ (A) are both VWE. Let X = ∫ x and Y = ∫ y. According to Theorem 3.1,
there exist g ∈ H(x) an h ∈ H(y) such that ∫Θ〈gθ,yθ − xθ〉dθ ≥ 0 and ∫Θ〈hθ,xθ − yθ〉dθ ≥ 0. Adding
up these two inequalities yields
∫
Θ〈gθ − hθ,yθ − xθ〉dθ ≥ 0.
(1) If G(A) is a strictly monotone game, then
∫
Θ〈gθ − hθ,xθ − yθ〉dθ = 0 and thus x = y almost
everywhere.
(2-3) If G(A) is an aggregatively strictly monotone game, then
∫
Θ〈gθ − hθ,xθ − yθ〉dθ = 0 and thus
X = Y .
If there is no aggregative constraint and fθ(·,Z) is strictly convex for all Z ∈ M, then for all θ, xθ
(resp. yθ) is the unique minimizer of fθ(·,X) (resp. fθ(·,Y )). Since X = Y , one has xθ = yθ.
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4 Approximating a Nonatomic Aggregate Game
4.1 Atomic Approximating Sequence
After discussing the existence and uniqueness properties of NE/VNE and WE/VWE in finite-player and
nonatomic aggregative games, we shall study the relationship between these notions. First note that NE
(resp. WE) is a particular case of VNE (resp. VWE) when the aggregate constraint set is any subset of
RT containing X . On the one hand, one may naturally expect that, when the number of players grows
very large in a finite-player aggregative game, the game gets “close” to a nonatomic aggregative game.
On the other hand, since there is a larger literature on algorithms for finite dimensional VI than for
infinite dimensional ones, it can be helpful for the computation of WE/VWE to find a NE/VNE that
approximates the former with arbitrary precision.
This section shows the following result: Considering a sequence of equilibria of “approximating” finite-
player aggregative games (Gν(Aν))ν of a nonatomic game G(A), where each player in Gν(Aν) represents
a collection of nonatomic players who are similar in their action sets and cost functions, a sequence of
VNE in (Gν(Aν))ν converges to the VWE of G(A) when this one is (aggregatively) strongly monotone.
In this section, we always consider that Assumptions 1 to 6 hold.
Let us consider the following definition of an approximating sequence:
Definition 4.1. Atomic Approximating Sequence (AAS)
A sequence of finite-player aggregative games {Gν(Aν) = (Iν , X˜ ν , (fνi )i, Aν) : ν ∈ N∗} with aggrega-
tive constraints is an atomic approximating sequence (AAS) for the nonatomic aggregative game G(A) =(
Θ, X˜ , (fθ)θ, A
)
with an aggregative constraint if, for each ν ∈ N∗, there exists a partition (Θν0 ,Θν1 , . . . ,ΘνIν )
of the set Θ, where Iν , |Iν |, such that the Lebesgue measure of Θν0 is µν0 = 0, and if, for each i ∈ Iν ,
the Lebesgue measure of Θνi is µνi > 0 while the collection of nonatomic players in Θνi corresponding to
finite player i ∈ Iν satisfies that, as ν → +∞:
i) δν , maxi∈Iν δνi −→ 0, where δi is the Hausdorff distance between the feasible pure-action sets of
nonatomic players in Θνi and the scaled feasible pure-action set of finite player i ∈ Iν :
δνi , sup
θ∈Θν
i
dH
(
Xθ, 1µν
i
X νi
)
, (12)
and spanX νi = spanXθ for all θ ∈ Θνi .
ii) λν , maxi∈Iν λνi −→ 0, where λνi measures the difference between the subdifferential of a finite
player’s cost function when she takes or not into account the impact of her own action on the aggregate
profile:
λνi , sup
(x,Y )∈M2
sup
g∈∂1fˆνi (µνi x,Y −µνi x)
d (g, ∂1fνi (µνi x,Y )) (13)
(Recall that fˆνi (xi,X−i) , fνi (xi,X). The subgradients of fˆνi with respect to the first variable count
the impact of xi on X while the subgradients of fνi with respect to the first variable do not.)
iii) dν , maxi∈Iν dνi −→ 0, where dνi measures the Hausdorff distance between the subdifferential of
nonatomic players’ cost functions and that of the finite players’ cost functions:
dνi , sup
θ∈Θi
sup
(x,Y )∈M2
dH (∂1fνi (µνi x,Y ), ∂1fθ(x,Y )) . (14)
iv) Dν −→ 0, where Dν , dH (Aν , A) is the Hausdorff distance between the aggregative constraint set
Aν ⊂ RT and the aggregative constraint set A ⊂ RT . Besides, spanA = spanAν for all ν ∈ N∗.
Remark 4.1. Roughly speaking, along an AAS, the impact of a finite player’s action on the aggregate
profile gradually disappears. Besides, the pure-action set of a finite player converges to the pure-action
set of a nonatomic player in the subset of Θ that the finite player represents, whereas the subgradients
of her cost with respect to her own action also tend to those of a nonatomic player that she represents.
Finally, the aggregate-profile constraint sets in the AAS converge to the one in the nonatomic game.
Note that, except the last condition on Dν , the other conditions are independent of the constraint
sets (Aν)ν and A.
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Remark 4.2. Without loss of generality, we assume ri (A ∩ X ) 6= ∅ in this section. Indeed, if the
nonempty convex compact set A ∩ X has an empty relative interior, then it is reduced to a point hence
the problem becomes trivial.
In Section 4.3, we will construct an AAS for two fairly general cases of nonatomic games.
In order to compare a pure-action profile in a finite-player game and one in a nonatomic game, we
introduce the following linear mappings which define an equivalent nonatomic action profile for a finite-
player action profile and vice versa.
First, define ψν :MIν → L2([0, 1],M) for each ν ∈ N∗ by
∀xν ∈MIν , ψν(xν) = (ψνθ (xν))θ∈Θ , where ψνθ (xν) ,
xνi
µνi
, ∀i ∈ Iν , ∀θ ∈ Θνi . (15)
The interpretation of ψν is the following. If one considers finite player i ∈ Iν as a coordinator of the
coalition formed by a group of nonatomic players represented by set Θνi equipped with Lebesgue measure,
then ψνθ (xν) dictates the behavior of each of them.
Then, define mapping ψν : L2([0, 1],M)→MIν for each ν ∈ N∗ by
∀x ∈ L2([0, 1],MT ), ψν(x) = (ψνi (x))i∈Iν , where ψνi (x) = ∫Θνi xθ dθ . (16)
The interpretation of ψν is that the nonatomic players in Θνi form a coalition which behaves like a finite
player, so that ψνi (x) is just her pure-action.
Finally, let us make the following assumption for this section.
Assumption 7. There is a strictly positive constant η and a pure-action profile x¯ ∈ X˜ such that, for
almost all θ ∈ Θ, d(x¯θ, rbdXθ) > η.
It means that the pure-action space of each player has an (aggregatively) nonempty relative interior
and that the relative interior is not vanishing along any sequence of players.
4.2 Convergence of Equilibrium Profiles and Aggregate Equilibrium Profiles
The following Theorem 4.1 gives the main result of this paper. It shows that a VWE in a strongly
monotone nonatomic aggregative game can be approximated by VNE of an AAS, both in the case with
and without aggregative constraints.
Recall that, according to Theorem 3.4, a strongly monotone game is strictly monotone, hence the VWE
is unique, while an aggregatively strongly monotone game is aggregatively strictly monotone, hence the
aggregate-action profile at VWE is unique.
Theorem 4.1 (Convergence of VNE to VWE). Under Assumptions 1 to 7, let (Gν(Aν))ν be an AAS
of nonatomic aggregative game G(A) with an aggregative constraint. Let x∗ be the VWE of G(A),
xˆν ∈ X˜ ν(Aν) a VNE of Gν(Aν) for each ν ∈ N∗, and X∗, Xˆν their respective aggregate-action profiles.
Then there exists constants ρ > 0 and ρ¯ > 0 such that the following results hold with KA , M+1min{ρ,ρ¯} :
(1) If G is aggregatively strongly monotone with modulus β, (Xˆν)ν converges to X∗: for all ν ∈ N∗
such that max(δν , Dν) < min{ρ¯, ρ},
‖Xˆν −X∗‖2 ≤ 1
β
(
(3Bf + 1)KA max(Dν , δ
ν) + (2M + 1)(dν + λν)
)
. (17)
(2) If G is strongly monotone with modulus α, then (ψν(xˆν))ν (cf. Eq. (15)), converges to x∗ in
L2-norm: for all ν ∈ N∗ such that max(δν , Dν) < min{ρ¯, ρ},
‖ψν(xˆν)− x∗‖22 ≤
1
α
(
(3Bf + 1)KA max(Dν , δ
ν) + (2M + 1)(dν + λν)
)
. (18)
If there are no aggregate constraints, replace KA and Dν all by 0 in (17) and (18).
Some notions and a series of lemmas are needed for the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Firstly, for ν ∈ N∗, define a new norm ‖ · ‖ν on RTIν by ‖xν‖ν ,
(∑
i∈Iν
‖xνi ‖2
µν
i
) 1
2 = 〈xν , Dµνxν〉 12 ,
where Dµν is the symmetric positive definite matrix diag( 1µν1 IT , . . . ,
1
µν
Nν
IT ), with IT being the T -
dimensional identity matrix. Denote by dν the associated metric, and by diamν the diameter of a
set with norm ‖ · ‖ν .
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It is easy to see that ‖xν‖ ≤ √µν‖xν‖ν , where µν , maxi∈Iν µνi .
The advantage of using ν-norm for game Gν is that it keeps the norm of pure-action profiles at the
same order of those in the nonatomic game, instead of
√
µν times smaller. Indeed, ψν is an isomorphism
from X˜ ν (with ν-norm) to ψν(X˜ ν) (with L2-norm):
‖ψν(xν)‖22 =
∫
Θ
‖ψνθ (xν)‖2 dθ =
∑
i∈Iν
∫
Θν
i
‖x
ν
i
µνi
‖2 dθ =
∑
i∈Iν
‖xνi ‖2
µνi
= ‖xν‖2ν .
Besides, since X νi ’s, Xθ’s, X˜ ν(Aν)’s and X˜ (A) are all convex and closed in their respective Hilbert
spaces, the projection functions onto these sets are well defined.
Notations. Let Πνi (·) denote the projection function onto 1µν
i
X νi for i ∈ Iν and Πθ(·) the projection
function onto Xθ for θ ∈ Θ.
Let Πν denote the projection function onto X˜ ν(Aν) ⊂ RIνT , and Π the projection function onto
X˜ (A) ⊂ L2([0, 1],RT ;µ).
The following Lemma 4.1 shows that the players become infinitesimal along an ASS. When scaled by
1
µν , they stay at the same order as a nonatomic player.
Lemma 4.1. Under Assumption 3, for all ν ∈ N∗, ‖xν‖ν ≤ δν + M and ‖xν‖ ≤
√
µν(δν + M) for all
xν ∈ X˜ ν .
Proof. Let xνi ∈ X νi and θ ∈ Θνi . By definition of δνi ,
∥∥xνi
µν
i
− Πθ
(xνi
µν
i
)∥∥ ≤ δνi so that ‖xνi ‖ ≤ µνi (δνi +∥∥Πθ(xνiµν
i
)
∥∥) ≤ µνi (δνi + M). Then, ‖xν‖2ν = ∑Iνi=1 ‖xνi ‖2µν
i
≤ ∑Iνi=1 µνi (δνi + M)2 ≤ (δν + M)2, and hence
‖xν‖2 ≤ µν(δν +M)2.
The following lemma shows that the convergence of the pure-action set of a player in finite-player
game Gν to that of her corresponding nonatomic player in G, assumed by Eq. (12), can be described by
the convergence of spaces of pure-action profiles. Although X˜ ν is of finite dimension while X˜ is of infinite
dimension, the isomorphism ψν is used to here so that the analysis is done on L2([0, 1],RT ).
Lemma 4.2 (Convergence of X˜ ν to X˜ ). Under Assumption 3, for all ν ∈ N∗,
(1) for each xν ∈ X˜ ν , d2(ψν(xν), X˜ ) ≤ δν ;
(2) for each x ∈ X˜ , dν(ψν(x), X˜ ν) ≤ δν , d(ψν(x), X˜ ν) ≤
√
µνδ
ν ;
(3) for each i ∈ Iν and each xνi ∈ X νi , if d(x
ν
i
µν
i
, rbd X
ν
i
µν
i
) > δνi , then
xνi
µν
i
∈ Xθ for all θ ∈ Θνi ;
(4) for each i ∈ Iν , each θ ∈ Θνi , and each xθ ∈ Xθ, if d(xθ, rbdXθ) > δνi , then µνi xθ ∈ X νi .
Proof. (1) Let xν ∈ X˜ ν . For each i ∈ Iν and each θ ∈ Θνi , define yθ = Πθ(ψνθ (xν)) ∈ Xθ, so that
‖yθ − ψνθ (xν)‖ ≤ δνi . Let us show that y is measurable on each Θνi , hence measurable on Θ so that
y ∈ X . For that, define κi on Θνi ×MT by κi : (θ,w) 7→ ‖xνi −w‖. Then, κi is a Carathe´odory function.
Since the correspondence Θνi 3 θ 7→ Xθ is measurable, according to the measurable maximum theorem
[1, Thm. 18.19], there is a measurable selection of xθ ∈ arg minXθ κi(θ, ·). The minimum of κi(θ, ·) on
Xθ is unique and is just yθ, hence y is measurable on Θνi .
Then, ‖ψν(xν)− y‖2 ≤ δν , which shows that d2(ψν(xν), X˜ ) ≤ δν .
(2) Let x ∈ X˜ . For each i ∈ Iν , θ ∈ Θνi , ‖xθ − Πνi (xθ)‖ ≤ δνi . Since 1µν
i
X νi is a convex subset in RT ,
1
µν
i
∫
Θν
i
Πνi (xθ) dθ ∈ 1µν
i
X νi . Define y ∈ X˜ ν by yi ,
∫
Θν
i
Πνi (xθ) dθ ∈ X νi for i ∈ Iνi . Then,
‖ψν(x)− y‖2ν =
∑
i∈Iν
1
µνi
‖ψνi (x)−
∫
Θν
i
Πνi (xθ) dθ‖2 =
∑
i∈Iν
1
µνi
‖
∫
Θν
i
(xθ −Πνi (xθ)) dθ‖2
≤
∑
i∈Iν
1
µνi
µνi
∫
Θi
‖xθ −Πνi (xθ)‖2 dθ =
∑
i∈Iν
∫
Θi
‖xθ −Πνi (xθ)‖2 dθ ≤
∑
i∈Iν
µνi (δνi )2 ≤ (δ
ν)2,
so that ‖ψν(x)− y‖ν ≤ δν , and ‖ψν(x)− y‖ ≤
√
µνδ
ν . This concludes the proof.
(3) Fix ν ∈ N∗, i ∈ Iν and θ ∈ Θνi . Consider xνi ∈ X νi such that d(x
ν
i
µν
i
, rbd X
ν
i
µν
i
) > η for some η > δνi .
Assume that x
ν
i
µν
i
/∈ Xθ i.e.
∥∥xνi
µν
i
−ΠXθ (x
ν
i
µν
i
)
∥∥ > 0. Let yνi = xνiµν
i
+η
xν
i
µν
i
−ΠXθ (
xν
i
µν
i
)∥∥xνi
µν
i
−ΠXθ (
xν
i
µν
i
)
∥∥ ∈ Xνiµνi . Since X νi is convex,
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d(yνi ,Xθ) =
∥∥xνi
µν
i
− ΠXθ (x
ν
i
µν
i
)
∥∥ + ∥∥yνi − xνiµν
i
∥∥ > η > δν , which contradicts the fact that d(Xθ, xνiµν
i
) ≤ δνi .
Hence x
ν
i
µν
i
∈ Xθ.
(4) The proof is similar to that of (3).
The sets of aggregate-action profiles in Gν(Aν) with aggregative constraints converges to the set of
aggregate-action profiles of the nonatomic game G(A) with an aggregative constraint, as the following
lemma says.
Lemma 4.3. Under Assumption 3, for ν ∈ N∗,
(1) dH(X ν ,X ) ≤ δν ;
(2) for X ∈ riX , if d(X, rbdX ) > δν , then X ∈ X ν ; for Xν ∈ riX ν , if d(X, rbdX ν) > δν , then X ∈ X ;
(3) for X ∈ riA, if d(X, rbdA) > Dν , then X ∈ Aν ; for Xν ∈ riAν , if d(Xν , rbdAν) > Dν , then
Xν ∈ A;
(4) for X ∈ ri (X ∩A), if d(X, rbd (X ∩A)) > max(δν , Dν), then X ∈ X ν ∩Aν ; for Xν ∈ ri (X ν ∩Aν),
if d(Xν , rbd (X ν ∩Aν)) > max(δν , Dν), then Xν ∈ X ∩A.
Proof. (1) Define mapping Sν from MIν to RT by Sν(xν) = ∑i∈Iν xνi . Then Sν is nonexpansive hence
it is continuous. To see this, let zν and wν be in MIν , then by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
∥∥ ∑
i∈Iν
zνi −
∑
i∈Iν
wνi
∥∥2 = ∥∥ ∑
i∈Iν
zνi −wνi√
µνi
√
µνi
∥∥2 ≤ ∑
i∈Iν
‖zνi −wνi ‖2
µνi
·
∑
i∈Iν
µνi = ‖zν −wν‖2ν .
Now fix x ∈ X˜ . Consider y ∈ X˜ ν such that ‖ψν(x)−y‖ν ≤ δν (cf. Lemma 4.2). Then ‖
∑
i∈Iν ψ
ν
i (x)−∑
i∈Iν yi‖2 ≤ ‖ψ
ν(x)− y‖2ν ≤ (δ
ν)2. Hence d(
∫
x,X ν) ≤ ‖∑i∈Iν ψνi (x)−∑i∈Iν yi‖ ≤ δν .
On the other hand, let xν ∈ X˜ ν , thus Xν ,∑i∈Iν xνi ∈ X ν . For each i ∈ Iν and each θ ∈ Θνi , define
yθ = Πθ
( 1
µν
i
xνi
) ∈ Xθ, so that ‖ 1µν
i
xνi −yθ‖ ≤ δνi . Then, ‖
∑
i∈Iν x
ν
i −
∫
y‖ ≤∑i∈Iν ‖ ∫Θν
i
1
µν
i
xνi −yθ dθ‖ ≤∑
i∈Iν
∫
Θν
i
‖ 1µν
i
xνi − yθ‖ dθ ≤
∑
i∈Iν µ
ν
i δ
ν
i ≤ δ
ν , which shows that d
(
Xν ,X ) ≤ δν for all Xν ∈ X ν .
(2-3) The proof is similar to that for Lemma 4.2.(3).
(4) These are corollaries of (2) and (3).
Lemma 4.4. Under Assumptions 3 and 7, there is a strictly positive constant ρ and a nonatomic pure-
action profile z ∈ X˜ such that ∫ z ∈ ri (X ∩A) and, for almost all θ ∈ Θ, d(zθ, rbdXθ) > 3ρ.
Proof. Take x¯ the nonatomic pure-action profile in Assumption 7 and an arbitrary y ∈ X˜ (A) such that∫
y ∈ ri (X ∩A).
Denote t = d(
∫
y,rbd (X∩A))
3M . Define profile z ∈ X˜ by z = y − t(y − x¯).
Firstly, ‖ ∫ y − ∫ z‖ = t‖ ∫ y − ∫ x¯‖ ≤ t2M ≤ 23d(∫ y, rbd (X ∩A)), hence ∫ z ∈ ri (X ∩A).
Besides, for any θ, zθ = yθ − t(yθ − x¯θ). Since d(x¯θ, rbdXθ) > η, yθ ∈ Xθ, and Xθ is convex, one has
d(zθ, rbdXθ) > ηt = η3M d(
∫
y, rbd (X ∩A)). One concludes by defining ρ , η9M d(
∫
y, rbd (X ∩A)).
Notations. Denote Z =
∫
z where z is the one in Lemma 4.4. Define ρ¯ = 13d(Z, rbdX ∩A) > 0. Then,
for ν ∈ N∗ such that max(δν , Dν) < 3ρ¯, d(Z, rbd (X ν ∩Aν)) ≥ 3ρ¯−max(δν , Dν).
The following lemma shows that the space of pure-action profiles in the finite-player game with ag-
gregative constraint, X˜ ν(Aν), is converging to the space of pure-action profiles in the nonatomic game
with aggregative constraint, X˜ (A).
Lemma 4.5 (Convergence of X˜ ν(Aν) to X˜ (A)). Under Assumptions 3 and 7, let KA = M+1min{ρ,ρ¯} . Then,
for all ν ∈ N∗ such that max(δν , Dν) < min{ρ¯, ρ},
(1) for each xν ∈ X˜ ν(Aν), d2(ψν(xν), X˜ (A)) ≤ 2KA max(Dν , δν);
(2) for each x ∈ X˜ (A), dν(ψν(x), X˜ ν(Aν)) ≤ KA max(Dν , δν) and d(ψν(x), X˜ ν(Aν)) ≤
√
µνKA max(Dν , δ
ν).
Proof. (1) Consider xν ∈ X˜ ν(Aν) and Xν = ∑i xνi , i.e. Sν(xν). Consider z in Lemma 4.4 and Z = ∫ z.
Let zν , ψν(z). Since for each θ, d(zθ, rbdXθ) > 3ρ > δν , zν ∈ X˜ ν according to Lemma 4.2.(4).
Also, d(z
ν
i
µν
i
, rbd X
ν
i
µν
i
) ≥ 2ρ. Indeed, if yiµν
i
∈ N2ρ(z
ν
i
µν
i
), then let yθ , zθ + ( yiµν
i
− zνiµν
i
) for θ ∈ Θνi . Then,
yθ ∈ N2ρ(zθ) ⊂ Xθ as spanXθ = spanX νi , and d(yθ, rbdXθ) ≥ d(zθ, rbdXθ)− ‖zθ − yθ‖ > 3ρ− 2ρ = ρ.
Hence, from 4.2.(4), one has yiµν
i
∈ Xνiµν
i
.
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(Sν)−1(Aν)
X˜ ν
X˜ ν(Aν)
xν
zν
wν
2ρ
Xν
Z
W ν
2ρ¯
2tmin{ρ, ρ¯}
Sν=⇒
Aν
X ν
X ν ∩Aν
Figure 1: Illustration of the mapping Sν between X˜ ν(Aν) and X ∩A used in Lemma 4.5
Besides, since max(δν , Dν) < ρ¯, one has d(Z, rbd (X ν ∩Aν)) ≥ 2ρ¯.
Define wν , xν + t(zν − xν) with t , max(Dν ,δ
ν)
min{ρ,ρ¯} < 1. Let W ν = Sν(wν). Then, ‖wν − xν‖ν =
max(Dν , δν)‖z
ν−xν‖ν
min{ρ,ρ¯} ≤ max(Dν , δ
ν) 2(M+1)min{ρ,ρ¯} .
The linear mapping Sν maps the segment linking xν and zν in X˜ ν(Aν) to a segment linking Xν
and Z in X ν ∩ Aν . Hence, by the definition of wν , N2tmin{ρ,ρ¯}(W ν) ∩ span (X ν ∩ Aν) ⊂ X ν ∩ Aν ,
because each point in N2tmin{ρ,ρ¯}(W ν) ∩ span (X ν ∩ Aν) is on the segment linking Xν and some point
in N2 min{ρ,ρ¯}(Z) ∩ span (X ν ∩ Aν) ⊂ X ν ∩ Aν . In particular, 2tmin{ρ, ρ¯} = 2 max(Dν , δν) means
that d(W ν , rbd (X ν ∩ Aν)) ≥ 2 max(Dν , δν) > max(Dν , δν). Consequently, W ν ∈ X ∩ A according to
Lemma 4.3(4).
Then, in the same manner, one has d(w
ν
i
µν
i
, rbd X
ν
i
µν
i
) > 2tρ > δνi . Thus, Lemma 4.3(3) implies that
wν
µν
i
∈ Xθ for each θ ∈ Θνi , hence ψν(wν) ∈ X˜ ν and ψν(wν) ∈ X˜ ν(A).
Finally, ‖xν −wν‖ν ≤ max(Dν , δν) 2(M+1)min{ρ,ρ¯} . Hence, d2(ψν(xν), X˜ (A)) ≤ 2KA max(Dν , δ
ν).
The proof for (2) is similar and omitted.
X˜ ν(Aν)
X˜ (A)
x2
x1
X ν1
X˜ ν
X ν2
X˜
S−1(A)
(Sν)−1(Aν)
xν ΠX˜ (x
ν)
Π(xν)
Figure 2: Difference between projections on X˜ and on X˜ (A). (Since it is impossible to draw the graph
of a L2 pure-action-profile space with a continuum of players, we illustrate the idea with two players.)
Remark 4.3 (Difference between unilateral projections of actions and collective projection of the action
profile). Lemma 4.5 shows that d2(ψν(xν),Π(ψν(xν))) ≤ 2KA max(Dν , δν) and d(ψν(x),Πν(ψν(x))) ≤√
µνKA max(Dν , δ
ν). Recall that Π and Πν stand for the projection functions onto X˜ (A) and X˜ ν(Aν).
Lemma 4.5 is of first importance for our proof of Theorem 4.1. Without this lemma, we only have the
convergence of individual, i.e. unilateral pure-action spaces in the AAS to the unilateral pure-action
spaces in the nonatomic game, as shown in Lemma 4.2. Without coupling constraints, this should
be sufficient in the proof of the convergence of NE. However, in the presence of coupling aggregative
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constraints, this convergence of unilateral pure-action spaces is not enough. Given a profile in X˜ ν(Aν),
unilateral projection of each atomic player’s pure-action onto the corresponding nonatomic players’ pure-
action spaces, i.e. from X νi to Xθ, cannot guarantee that the resulting profile of pure-actions is in X˜ (A),
and vice versa. Lemma 4.5 shows that, for each pure-action profile xν ∈ X˜ ν(Aν), its projection on the
space of finite-player pure-action profiles in X˜ (A) very close to xν , and vice versa.
We are finally ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Fix ν ∈ N∗, define yˆν = ψ(xˆν) ∈ L2([0, 1],RT ) and zˆν , Π(yˆν). Then zˆν ∈ X˜ (A)
is a pure-action profile in nonatomic game G(A). By the definition of VWE (cf. Eq. (11)), there is
g ∈ H(x∗) such that ∫ 10 〈gθ(x∗θ,X∗), x∗θ − zˆνθ 〉dθ ≤ 0.
Secondly, by the definition of VNE (cf. Eq. (3)), there is hi ∈ ∂1fˆνi (xˆνi , Xˆν−i) for each i ∈ Iν such
that
∑
i∈Iν
〈
hi(xˆνi , Xˆν−i), xˆνi − zνi 〉 ≤ 0 for all zνi ∈ X νi . For all i ∈ Iν and θ ∈ Θνi , by the definition of
λνi and dνi (cf. Eqs. (13) and (14)), there exists r ∈ H(yˆν) with rθ ∈ ∂1fθ(yˆνθ , Yˆ ν) = ∂1fθ( xˆ
ν
θ
µν
i
, Xˆν) such
that ‖rθ(yˆνθ , Yˆ ν)− hi(xˆνθ , Xˆν−i)‖ ≤ λνi + dνi .
Thirdly, ‖yˆν − zˆν‖2 ≤ 2KA max(Dν , δν) by Lemma 4.5.
With these two results, while noticing that yˆνθ ≤M + δ
ν for all θ by Lemma 4.1 and that Xˆν = Yˆ ν ,
one has: ∫
Θ
〈
gθ(x∗θ,X∗)− rθ(yˆνθ , Yˆ ν), x∗θ − yˆνθ
〉
dθ
=
∫
Θ
〈gθ(x∗θ,X∗), x∗θ − zˆνθ 〉 dθ +
∫
Θ
〈gθ(x∗θ,X∗), zˆνθ − yˆνθ 〉 dθ
+
∑
i∈Iν
∫
Θν
i
〈
rθ(yˆνθ , Yˆ ν)−hi(xˆνi , Xˆν−i), yˆνθ−x∗θ
〉
dθ+
∑
i∈Iν
∫
Θν
i
〈
hi(xˆνi , Xˆν−i), yˆνθ−x∗θ
〉
dθ
≤ 0+
∫
Θ
‖gθ(x∗θ,X∗)‖ ‖zˆθ−yˆνθ ‖dθ+
∑
i∈Iν
∫
Θν
i
‖rθ(yˆνθ , Yˆ ν)−hi(xˆνθ , Xˆν−i)‖ ‖yˆνθ−x∗θ‖ dθ+Jν
≤ 2Bf KA max(Dν , δν) + (2M + δν)(dν + λν) + Jν (19)
where Jν ,
∑
i∈Iν
∫
Θν
i
〈
hi(xˆνi , Xˆν−i), yˆνθ − x∗θ
〉
dθ.
Next, for the VWE x∗ ∈ X˜ (A), let y∗ν = ψ(x∗) ∈MIν and z∗ν , Πν(y∗ν) ∈ X˜ ν(Aν):
Jν =
∑
i∈Iν
〈
hi(xˆνi , Xˆν−i), xˆνi − y∗νi
〉
=
∑
i∈Iν
〈
hi(xˆνi , Xˆν−i), xˆνi − z∗νi
〉
+
∑
i∈Iν
〈
hi(xˆνi , Xˆν−i), z∗
ν
i − y∗νi
〉
≤ 0 + (Bf + λν) ‖z∗ν − y∗ν‖ ≤ (Bf + λν)
√
µνKA max(Dν , δ
ν) , (20)
because of the definition of VNE xˆν , the definition of λν and Lemma 4.5.(i).
Let us summarize by combining (19) and (20):∫
Θ
〈
gθ(x∗θ,X∗)− rθ(yˆνθ , Yˆ ν),x∗θ − yˆνθ
〉
dθ
≤ (3Bf + 1)KA max(Dν , δν) + (2M + 1)(dν + λν) .
(21)
Hence, if G is strongly monotone with modulus α, then α ‖yˆν − x∗‖22 ≤ (2Bf + 1)KA(Dν + δ
ν) +
(2M + 1)(dν + λν). If G is aggregatively strongly monotone with modulus β, then β‖Xˆν − X∗‖2 ≤
(3Bf + 1)KA max(Dν , δ
ν) + (2M + 1)(dν + λν).
Remark 4.4. The strong monotonicity of the nonatomic game G, either with respect to pure-action
profile or with respect to aggregate-action profile, is essential in this result. Strict monotonicity is not
enough, in contrast to finite-player games (cf. [50]). Indeed, since L2([0, 1],MT ) is only weakly compact,
one cannot ensure that
∫
Θ〈gθ(x∗θ,X∗)−rθ(yˆνθ , Yˆ ν),x∗θ− yˆνθ 〉dθ tends to
∫
Θ〈gθ(x∗θ,X∗)−rθ(zˆθ, Zˆ),x∗θ−
zˆθ〉dθ in (21), where zˆ is an accumulation point of (yˆν)ν in the weak topology.
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4.3 Construction of an Atomic Approximating Sequence
As seen in our previous results, a nonatomic player θ is characterized by two elements: her pure-action
set Xθ, and her subdifferential correspondence ∂1fθ defined from M2 to RT : (x,Y ) 7→ ∂1fθ(x,Y ).
Note that it is the subdifferential of the cost function ∂1fθ, instead of the cost function fθ itself,
that characterizes a nonatomic player’s type. For example, two players θ and ξ with Xθ = Xξ and
fθ(x,Y ) ≡ fξ(x,Y )+C where C is a strictly positive constant can be seen as identical in their behavior.
This section presents the construction of an AAS for a given nonatomic game G in two particular
cases: (1) the player characteristic profile θ 7→ (Xθ, ∂1fθ) is piecewise continuous (cf. Definition 4.2)
and, (2) {Xθ, θ ∈ Θ} and {fθ, θ ∈ Θ} are respectively polytopes and functions parameterized by a finite
number of real parameters.
Case 1: Piecewise Continuous Characteristics – Uniform Splitting
Definition 4.2 (Continuity of nonatomic player characteristic profile). The player characteristic profile
θ 7→ (Xθ, ∂1fθ) in nonatomic game G is continuous at θ ∈ Θ if, for all ε > 0, there exists η > 0 such that:
for each θ′ ∈ Θ
|θ − θ′| ≤ η ⇒
{
dH(Xθ,Xθ′) ≤ ε
sup(x,Y )∈M×M dH (∂1fθ(x,Y ), ∂1fθ′(x,Y )) ≤ ε .
(22)
If (22) is true for all θ and θ′ on an interval Θ′ ⊂ Θ, then the player characteristic profile is uniformly
continuous on Θ′.
Assume that the player characteristic profile θ 7→ (Xθ, ∂1fθ) of nonatomic game G is piecewise con-
tinuous, with a finite number K of discontinuity points σ0 = 0 ≤ σ1 < σ2 < · · · < σK ≤ σK = 1, and
that it is uniformly continuous on (σk, σk+1), for each k ∈ {0, . . . ,K − 1}.
For ν ∈ N∗, define an ordered set of Iν cutting points by {υνi , i = 0, . . . , Iν} :=
{
k
ν
}
0≤k≤ν∪{σk}1≤k≤K
and the corresponding partition (Θνi )i∈Iν of Θ by:
Θνi = [υνi−1, υνi ) for i ∈ {1, . . . , Iν − 1} ; ΘνIν = [υνIν−1, 1].
Hence, µνi = υνi − υνi−1. Denote υ¯νi = υ
ν
i−1+υ
ν
i
2 .
Assumption 8. For each θ ∈ Θ and each x ∈ M, M′ 3 Y 7→ fθ(x,Y ) is convex. Denote the
subdifferential of fθ(x, ·) at Y by ∂2fθ(x,Y ). There is Bg > 0 such that ‖g‖ ≤ Bg for all g ∈ ∂2fθ(·, ·)
on M2 for all θ.
Proposition 4.1. Under Assumptions 3 to 6 and 8, for ν ∈ N∗, consider the finite-player game Gν(Aν)
with an aggregative constraint defined with Aν , A, player set Iν , {1 . . . Iν}, where for each finite
player i ∈ Iν :
X νi , µνi Xυ¯νi and fνi (x,Y ) , µνi fυ¯νi
(
1
µν
i
x,Y
)
, ∀(x,Y ) ∈ µνiM×M.
Then
(Gν(A))
ν
=
(Iν , X˜ ν , A, (fνi )i∈Iν)ν is an AAS of nonatomic game G(A).
Proof. First notice that µν ≤ 1ν hence it tends to 0.
Let us show the four points required by Definition 4.1 as follows.
i) Given an arbitrary ε > 0, there is a common modulus of uniform continuity η such that Eq. (22) is
true for all the intervals (σk, σk+1). For ν large enough, one has, for each i ∈ Iν , µνi < η so that for all
θ ∈ Θνi , |υ¯νi − θ| < η; hence dH
(Xθ, 1µν
i
X νi
)
= dH(Xθ,Xυ¯ν
i
) < ε.
ii) According to the continuity property, for all (x,Y ) ∈M2:
dH (∂1fνi (µνi x,Y ) , ∂1fθ(x,Y )) = dH
(
µνi
µν
i
∂1fυ¯ν
i
(
1
µν
i
µνi x,Y
)
, ∂1fθ(x,Y )
)
< ε.
To be rigorous, we need spanXθ to be the same for all θ ∈ Θνi . For this, we can further divide Θνi into a
finite number of, say n, groups so that the nonatomic players in each group have the same spanXθ. This
is possible because Xθ are all in RT , a finite dimensional space.
iii) Consider ∂1fˆνi (x,Y − x), the subdifferential of fˆνi (·,Y ′) at x, given Y ′ = Y − x. By definition,
fˆνi (·,Y ′) , fνi (·,Y ′ + ·). Consider fˆνi (·,Y ′) as a composition function on M′ defined by fνi ◦ L, where
L is the following affine mapping from µνiM′ to R2T :
L(x) =
(
IT
IT
)
x+
(
0T
Y ′
)
,
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where IT is the T -dimensional identity matrix and 0T the T -dimensional 0 vector.
On the one hand, according to [8, Proposition 16.6], ∂1fˆνi (x,Y − x) ⊂ {(IT , IT )g : g ∈ ∂fνi (x,Y )},
where ∂fνi (x,Y ) is the subdifferential of fνi at (x,Y ). On the other hand, according to [8, Proposition
16.7],
∂fνi (x,Y ) ⊂
{(
g1
g2
)
: g1 ∈ ∂1fνi (x,Y ), g2 ∈ ∂2fνi (x,Y )
}
.
Therefore, ∂1fˆνi (x,Y − x) ⊂ {g1 + g2 : g1 ∈ ∂1fνi (x,Y ), g2 ∈ ∂2fνi (x,Y )}.
By the definition of fνi , at (x,Y ) ∈ µνiM×M, the subdifferential of fνi with respect to the second
variable is ∂2fνi (x,Y ) = µνi fυ¯νi (
1
µν
i
x,Y ), hence each g2 ∈ ∂2fνi (x,Y ) is bounded by µνiBg in l2-norm
according to Assumption 8. In consequence, for each h ∈ ∂1fˆνi (x,Y − x), there is g1 ∈ ∂1fνi (x,Y ) such
that ‖h− g1‖ ≤ µνiBg. Finally, set λνi , µνiBg, and λ
ν , maxi λνi tends to 0.
iv) By definition, Dν = 0.
Case 2: Finite-dimensions Parameterized Characteristics – Meshgrid Approximation
Assume that nonatomic game G satisfy two conditions:
(i) The feasible pure-action sets are K-dimensional polytopes: there exist a constant real-valued K×T
matrix A, and a bounded mapping b : Θ → RK , such that for any θ, Xθ = {x ∈ RT : Ax ≤ bθ}, which
is a nonempty, bounded, closed and convex polytope in RT .
(ii) There is a bounded mapping s : Θ → Rl such that for any θ ∈ Θ, fθ(·, ·) = f(·, · ; sθ). Further-
more, for all (x,Y ) ∈ M2, ∂1f(x,Y ; ·) is Lipschitz-continuous in s and with a Lipschitz constant L3,
independent of x and Y .
Denote bk = minθ bθ,k, bk = maxθ bθ,k for k ∈ {1 . . .K} and sk = minθ sθ,k, sk = maxθ sθ,k for k ∈
{1 . . . l}. The characteristics of player θ are parameterized by point (bθ, sθ) in
∏K
k=1[bk, bk]×
∏l
k=1[sk, sk],
a compact subset of RK+l.
Fix ν ∈ N∗, consider a uniform partition of the compact set ∏Kk=1[bk, bk] ×∏lk=1[sk, sk], obtained
by dividing each dimension of this compact set into ν equal parts. Hence, the partition is composed
of Iν , νK+l equal-sized subsets of
∏K
k=1[bk, bk] ×
∏l
k=1[sk, sk]. The cutting points of the partition
are bk,nk , bk +
nk
ν (bk − bk) for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, and sk,nk , sk + nkν (sk − sk) for k ∈ {1, . . . , l}, with
nk ∈ {0, . . . , ν}. Let the set of vectorial indices, indexing the partition, be denoted by:
Γν , {n = (nk)K+lk=1 ∈ NK+l |nk ∈ {1, . . . , ν}} .
Define the corresponding partition of the interval Θ: Θ =
⋃˙
n∈ΓνΘνn, where:
Θνn ,
{
θ ∈ Θ : bθ,k ∈ [bk,nk−1, bk,nk [ for 1 ≤ k ≤ K; sθ,k ∈ [sk,nk−1, sk,nk [ for 1 ≤ k ≤ l
}
.
To be rigorous, when bk,nk = bk or sk,nk = sk, the parameter interval is closed at the right.
Finally, define the set of players Iν as the elements n in Γν such that µ(Θνn) > 0.
Remark 4.5. If there is a set of players of strictly positive measure sharing the same b and s, then
condition maxi∈Iν µi → 0 is satisfied. In this case, adding another dimension in the partition by cutting
Θ = [0, 1] into ν uniform segments solves the problem.
Proposition 4.2. For ν ∈ N∗, let finite-player game Gν(Aν) with an aggregative constraint be defined
by Aν , A, player set Iν , {n ∈ Γν : µ(Θνn) > 0} and, for each finite player n ∈ Iν ,
X νn , {x ∈ RT |Ax ≤
∫
Θνn
bθ dθ} ,
fνn(x,Y ) , µνnf
( 1
µνn
x,Y ; 1µνn
∫
Θνn
sθ dθ
)
, ∀(x,Y ) ∈ µνiM×M.
Then, under Assumptions 3 to 6 and 8, (Gν(A))ν =
(Iν , X˜ ν , A, (fνi )i∈Iν)ν is an AAS of the nonatomic
game G(A) with an aggregative constraint.
Proof. Let us show the four properties required by Definition 4.1 as follows.
i) For each n ∈ Iν , 1µνnX
ν
n =
{
x ∈ RT : Ax ≤ 1µνn
∫
Θνn
bθ dθ
}
. Then, by a result generalized from [7,
Thm. 4.1], there is a constant C0 such that, for each θ′ ∈ Θνn: dH
(
Xθ′ , 1µνnX
ν
n
)
≤ C0
∥∥∥bθ′ − 1µνn ∫Θνn bθ dθ∥∥∥ ≤
C0
ν
∥∥b− b∥∥. Hence, δν tends to 0.
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ii) For each n ∈ Iν and each θ′ ∈ Θνn, for all (x,Y ) ∈M2, one has:
dH
(
∂1f
ν
n(µνnx,Y ) , ∂1fθ′(x,Y )
)
= dH
(
∂1f
(
x,Y ; 1µνn
∫
Θνn
sθ dθ
)
, ∂1f(x,Y ; sθ′)
)
≤ L3‖ 1
µνn
∫
Θνn
sθ dθ − sθ′‖ ≤ L3
ν
‖s− s‖ ,
by the Lipschitz continuity of ∂1f(x,Y ; ·). Hence, dν tends to 0.
iii) λν tends to 0 is proved as in Proposition 4.1;
iv) By definition, Dν = 0.
Remark 4.6. In Proposition 4.2, instead of the average value of the characteristics of nonatomic players
on Θνn, one can use the characteristic value of any nonatomic player in Θνn.
Remark 4.7. If the finite-player games constructed by these two constructions do not satisfy the con-
dition that fˆνi (·,Y−i) is convex in xi, then one can use the pseudo-VNE of Gν(Aν) (cf. Appendix). The
existence of pseudo-VNE is guaranteed by our construction of fνi ’s.
Recall that most of the aggregatively games have cost functions of form Eq. (10). As long as the
conditions in Proposition 3.1 (monotone per-unit cost of public products and concave private utility) are
satified, fˆνi (·,Y−i) is convex in xi.
Remark 4.8. In both constructions above, the number of finite players Iν tends to infinite and their
“size” µνi tends to zero. These conditions are not required in the definition of AAS. The two constructions
are made in this way for two reasons: firstly, nonatomic players’ characteristics (the pure-action set and
the subdifferential of their cost function with respect to the first variable) in a very small set Θνi are
ensured to be close enough by construction; secondly, the subdifferential of cost function fi of finite
player i with respect to the second variable X is vanishing so that she behaves almost like a nonatomic
player. If we consider pseudo-VNE instead of NE in the approximating finite-player games, then the
second reason no longer exists. If the nonatomic players are fairly homogeneous or even there are finitely-
many different types of them, then there is no need to divide Θ into smaller and smaller intervals to
regroup sufficiently homogeneous nonatomic players, as imposed by the first reason. We shall bear in
mind these two points when constructing an AAS for explicit games.
5 Conclusion
Theorem 4.1 provides a theoretical basis for the use of finite-dimensional VNE/NE as an approximation of
the VWE/WE in a strongly monotone or aggregatively strongly monotone nonatomic aggregative game
with or without aggregative constraints. There are numerous research themes related to this result and
our topic in general.
Firstly, one needs to find efficient algorithms for the computation of NE and VNE in finite-player
aggregative games with or without aggregative constraints via the solution of their characteristic vari-
ational inequalities. An extensive literature exists in this regard but our particular case of aggregative
game with aggregative constraints may lead to special methods or improvements on existing results [23].
Secondly, the extension of evolutionary dynamics for population games and related algorithms to
nonatomic games with infinitely many classes of players can be non trivial. A recent work [24] proposes
online learning methods for population games with heterogeneous convex pure-action sets. The presence
of aggregate constraints adds two additional difficulties as analyzed in Remarks 2.2 and 2.3. Evolutionary
dynamics in population games are based on unilateral adaptations from players. On the one hand, in the
presence of coupling constraints, unilateral deviations by players may well lead to a pure-action profile
violating the coupling constraint. On the other hand, a feasible deviation in the pure-action profile cannot
always be decomposed into unilateral deviations of players.
Thirdly, our results are limited to monotone games and the convergence result is limited to strongly
monotone games. The study of nonatomic games that are not monotone needs probably other approaches.
Indeed, even for population games where there are only finitely many types of players, there exist much
fewer results for games that are not linear, potential or monotone.
Fourthly, other methods to deal with aggregate constraints exist, such as rationing in the case of
capacity constraint of network or power grid.
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Appendix: Nonatomic behavior of finite players
In the definition of AAS, we suppose that the cost functions of a finite player in a finite-player game is
convex in her own action, i.e. fˆνi (·,Y−i) is convex on M for each fixed aggregate profile of her rivals
x−i. However, this condition can be replaced by the condition that fνi (·,Y ) is convex on M for each
fixed aggregate profile Y ∈ M, which is naturally satisfied with the two constructions presented in
Section 4.3. In this case, instead of considering VNE in the AAS, we consider another equilibrium notion
called pseudo-VNE, where finite players take themselves as nonatomic ones by ignoring the impact of
their action on the aggregate-action profile.
Consider a finite-player aggregative game G(A) with an aggregative constraint defined in Definition 2.3.
Define a correspondence H ′ : X˜ ⇒ RIT as follows: for all x ∈ X˜ , H ′(x) , {(gi)i∈I ∈ RIT : gi ∈
∂1fi(xi,X), ∀i ∈ I}, where X =
∑
i∈I xi is the aggregate-action profile induced by x.
Definition 5.1. A pseudo-VNE of a finite-player game G(A) with an aggregative constraint is a solution
to the following GVI:
Find xˆ ∈ X˜ (A) s.t. ∃g ∈ H ′(x) s.t. 〈g,x− xˆ〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X˜ (A) .
Remark 5.1 (Pseudo-VNE is not an equilibirum). A pseudo-NE/pseudo-VNE is not an equilibrium
from a game theoretical point of view. Defined as a solution to a certain GVI, it is an auxiliary notion
for the approximation of NE/VNE.
The authors in [21] refer to this equilibrium notion as Wardrop equilibrium. We avoid this name here
in order to distinguish it from the WE in nonatomic games.
Assumption 9 (Convex pseudo-costs). For each i ∈ I, the function fi(xi,Y ) is continuous in both
variables, and is convex in xi for all Y ∈ X .
Under Assumption 9, the existence of a pseudo-VNE can be proved as for VNE in Proposition 2.5.
Define a pseudo-AAS for a nonatomic aggregative game G(A) with an aggregative constraint be
defined almost exactly like an AAS, except that condition (iv) is no longer required, and Assumption 1
is replaced by Assumption 9. Then, in Theorem 4.1 one can replace the VNE by the pseudo-VNE.
Theorem 5.1 (Convergence of pseudo-VNE to VWE). Under Assumptions 2 to 6 and 9, let (Gν(Aν))ν
be a pseudo-AAS of G(A). Let x∗ be the VWE of G(A), xˆν ∈ X˜ ν(Aν) a pseudo-VNE of Gν(Aν) for each
ν ∈ N, and X∗, Xˆν their respective aggregate-action profiles. Then, there exist constants ρ > 0, ρ¯ and
KA , M+1min{ρ,ρ¯} for the following results to hold:
(1) If G is aggregatively strongly monotone with modulus β, then (Xˆν)ν converges to X∗: for all
ν ∈ N∗ such that 2 max(δν , Dν) < ρ, ‖Xˆν −X∗‖2 ≤ 1β
(
(3Bf + 1)KA max(Dν , δ
ν) + (2M + 1)dν
)
.
(2) If G is strongly monotone with modulus α, then (ψν(xˆν))ν converges to x∗ in L2-norm: for all
ν ∈ N∗ such that 2 max(δν , Dν) < ρ, ‖ψν(xˆν)− x∗‖22 ≤ 1α
(
(3Bf + 1)KA max(Dν , δ
ν) + (2M + 1)dν
)
.
If there are no aggregate constraint, replace KA and Dν all by 0.
The proof is almost the same as for Theorem 4.1. The only difference is that, instead of considering
hi ∈ ∂1fˆνi (xˆνi , Xˆν−i) for each i ∈ Iν such that
∑
i∈Iν
〈
hi(xˆνi , Xˆν−i), xˆνi − zνi 〉 ≤ 0 for all zνi ∈ Xi, one has
to consider hi ∈ ∂1fνi (xˆνi , Xˆν) for each i ∈ Iν such that
∑
i∈Iν
〈
hi(xˆνi , Xˆν), xˆνi −zνi 〉 ≤ 0 for all zi ∈ Xi.
References
[1] Aliprantis, C. D. and Border, K. (2006). Infinite Dimensional Analysis – A Hitchhiker’s Guide.
3rd ed. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
[2] Altman, E., Kameda, H. and Hosokawa, Y. (2002). Nash equilibria in load balancing in dis-
tributed computer systems. International Game Theory Review, 4 91–100.
20
[3] Atzeni, I., Ordo´n˜ez, L. G., Scutari, G., Palomar, D. P. and Fonollosa, J. R. (2013).
Demand-side management via distributed energy generation and storage optimization. IEEE Trans-
actions on Smart Grid, 4 866–876.
[4] Aumann, R. J. (1965). Integrals of set-valued functions. Journal of Mathematical Analysis and
Applications, 12 1–12.
[5] Aumann, R. J. (1969). Measurable utility and the measurable choice problem. In La De´cision.
Paris. Colloque Internationaux du C. N. R. S., 15–26.
[6] Aumann, R. J. (1976). An elementary proof that integration preserves uppersemicontinuity. Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 3 15–18.
[7] Batson, R. G. (1987). Combinatorial behavior of extreme points of perturbed polyhedra. Journal
of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 127 130–139.
[8] Bauschke, H. and Combettes, P. L. (2011). Convex Analysis and Monotone Operator Theory
in Hilbert Spaces. 2nd ed. Springer International Publishing.
[9] Beckmann, M., McGuire, C. B. and Winston, C. B. (1956). Studies in the Economics of
Transportation. Yale University Press.
[10] Carmona, G. and Podczeck, K. (2009). On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large
games. Journal of Economic Theory, 144 1300–1319.
[11] Cavazzuti, E., Pappalardo, M. and Passacantando, M. (2002). Nash equilibria, variational
inequalities, and dynamical systems. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 114 491–506.
[12] Chan, D. and Pang, J. S. (1982). The generalized quasi-variational inequality problem. Mathe-
matics of Operations Research, 7 211–222.
[13] Corcho´n, L. C. (1994). Comparative statics for aggregative games the strong concavity case.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 28 151–165.
[14] Correa, J. R., Schulz, A. S. and Stier-Moses, N. E. (2004). Selfish routing in capacitated
networks. Mathematics of Operations Research, 29 961–976.
[15] Debreu, G. (1952). A social equilibrium existence theorem. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the U.S.A., 38 866–893.
[16] Ding, X. P. and Tarafdar, E. (1996). Monotone generalized variational inequalities and gener-
alized complementarity problems. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 88 107–122.
[17] Facchinei, F. and Pang, J.-S. (2007). Finite-dimensional variational inequalities and complemen-
tarity problems. Springer Science & Business Media.
[18] Fan, K. (1952). Fixed-point and minimax theorems in locally convex topological linear spaces.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the U.S.A., 38 121–126.
[19] Fang, S. C. and Peterson, E. L. (1982). Generalized variational inequalities. Journal of Opti-
mization Theory and Applications, 38 363–383.
[20] Friesz, T. L., Bernstein, D., Mehta, N. J., Tobin, R. L. and Ganjalizadeh, S. (1994).
Day-to-day dynamic network disequilibria and idealized traveler information systems. Operations
Research, 42 1120–1136.
[21] Gentile, B., Parise, F., Paccagnan, D., Kamgarpour, M. and Lygeros, J. (2017). Nash
and Wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints. arXiv:1702.08789.
[22] Glicksberg, I. L. (1952). A further generalization of the Kakutani fixed point theorem, with
application to Nash equilibrium points. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 3 170–
174.
[23] Grammatico, S. (2017). Dynamic control of agents playing aggregative games with coupling con-
straints. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 62 4537–4548.
21
[24] Hadikhanloo, S. (2017). Learning in anonymous nonatomic games with applications to first-order
mean field games. arXiv:1704.00378.
[25] Harker, P. T. (1991). Generalized Nash games and quasi-variational inequalities. European Journal
of Operational Research, 54 81–94.
[26] Hartman, P. and Stampacchia, G. (1966). On some non-linear elliptic differential-functional
equations. Acta Mathematica, 115 271–310.
[27] Haurie, A. and Marcotte, P. (1985). On the relationship between Nash-Cournot and Wardrop
equilibria. Networks, 15 295–308.
[28] Hofbauer, J. and Sandholm, W. H. (2009). Stable games and their dynamics. Journal of
Economic Theory, 144 1665–1693, 1693.e4.
[29] Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K. (1998). Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge
University Press.
[30] Khan, M., Rath, K. P. and Sun, Y. (1997). On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games
with a continuum of players. Journal of Economic Theory, 76 13–46.
[31] Kulkarni, A. A. and Shanbhag, U. V. (2012). On the variational equilibrium as a refinement of
the generalized nash equilibrium. Automatica, 48 45–55.
[32] Larsson, T. and Patriksson, M. (1999). Side constrained traffic equilibrium models – analysis,
computation and applications. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 33 233–264.
[33] Marcotte, P., Nguyen, S. and Schoeb, A. (2004). A strategic flow model of traffic assignment
in static capacitated networks. Operations Research, 52 191–212.
[34] Marcotte, P. and Patriksson, M. (2007). Traffic equilibrium. In Transportation (C. Barn-
hart and G. Laporte, eds.), vol. 14 of Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science.
Elsevier, 623–713.
[35] Marcotte, P. and Zhu, D.-L. (1997). Equilibria with infinitely many differentiated classes of
customers. In Complementarity and Variational Problems, State of Art. SIAM, 234–258.
[36] Mas-Colell, A. (1984). On a theorem of Schmeidler. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 13
201–206.
[37] Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press.
[38] Milchtaich, I. (2000). Generic uniqueness of equilibrium in large crowding games. Mathematics
of Operations Research, 25 349–364.
[39] Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the U.S.A., 36 48–49.
[40] Orda, A., Rom, R. and Shimkin, N. (1993). Competitive routing in multiuser communication
networks. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 1 510–521.
[41] Rath, K. P. (1992). A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a
continuum of players. Economic Theory, 2 427–433.
[42] Rosenthal, R. W. (1973). The network equilibrium problem in integers. Networks, 3 53–59.
[43] Sandholm, W. H. (2001). Potential games with continuous player sets. Journal of Economic
Theory, 97 81–108.
[44] Sandholm, W. H. (2011). Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics. MIT Press.
[45] Schmeidler, D. (1973). Equilibrium points of nonatomic games. Journal of statistical Physics, 7
295–300.
[46] Smith, M. (1984). A descent algorithm for solving monotone variational inequalities and monotone
complementarity problems. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 44 485–496.
22
[47] Smith, M. J. (1984). The stability of a dynamic model of traffic assignment—an application of a
method of Lyapunov. Transportation Science, 18 245–252.
[48] Sorin, S. and Wan, C. (2016). Finite composite games: Equilibria and dynamics. Journal of
Dynamics & Games, 3 101–120.
[49] Taylor, P. D. and Jonker, L. B. (1978). Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics.
Mathematical Biosciences, 40 145–156.
[50] Wan, C. (2012). Coalitions in nonatomic network congestion games. Mathematics of Operations
Research, 37 654–669.
[51] Wardrop, J. G. (1952). Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research. In Proceedings of the
Institute of Civil Engineers, Part II, 1. 325–378.
[52] Zhang, D. and Nagurney, A. (1997). Formulation, stability, and computation of traffic network
equilibria as projected dynamical systems. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 93
417–444.
[53] Zhong, R., Sumalee, A., Friesz, T. and Lam, W. H. (2011). Dynamic user equilibrium with
side constraints for a traffic network: Theoretical development and numerical solution algorithm.
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 45 1035–1061.
[54] Zhu, D. and Marcotte, P. (1994). An extended descent framework for variational inequalities.
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 80 349–366.
23
